


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Near East/North Africa Report

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

KUWAITI DAILY INTERVIEWS FATAH OFFICIAL ON LEBANON

GF141400 Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 14 Jul 82 p 17

[Interview granted to Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM by Nimr Salih, Abu Salih, Fatah executive committee member, in Beirut--date not given]

[Excerpts] Asked about the results of Sunday's battle on the local, Arab and international levels, he said: What is going on in the Lebanese arena is an new thing.

On the political level, in my evaluation, what happened was not a war but an earthquake. This earthquake is not a U.S.-Israeli decision. Even before Habib had said it, there were some Arab and international stands which approved this decision. This approval is left for history to expose. In this regard I can say that the Palestinian-Lebanese steadfastness has entered the equation. The international factor is worried now. The sides of the equation have been trying with all their local and material powers for the past 2 weeks to bring the Palestinians and Lebanese to what had been planned for them. The steadfastness of the Lebanese to what had been planned for them. The steadfastness of the Lebanese and Palestinians before this equation has become legendary. This steadfastness 3 days ago made some powers support our departure from the equation instead of bringing us back to it once more, because the equation dictates that the Palestinian question should be resolved on the basis of Camp David and the eventual liquidation or submission of the Palestinians.

The steadfastness has penetrated the equation. In fact there is a disagreement in Israel, in the United States and in the Western bloc itself. This disagreement is over the losses that result from continuing this operation. Hence a new opinion emerged 3 days ago that there are only two choices: Either a U.S. pullout or continuation of the military battle to the end. We all know this. Now we witness the U.S. retreat. The United States retreats because it is worried that the results may affect its interests. Thus I can say that the aggression has achieved its military goals but not its political aims. It even opened new political horizons for the Palestinians and the entire Arab region.

Let Habib and his command understand that we will not give up or sign. They may choose to fight if they want. The result is that with our readiness to fight we shall force the United States to retreat. We can see that there is a

U.S. retreat rather than a continuation of the U.S. plan, and this is what worries Begin and Sharon. Sharon is waiting for our heads. I am confident that we shall stay in Lebanon and shall see Sharon and Begin dismissed from the Israeli Government.

Concerning the Arab stand, I am not surprised. Arab incapability existed even before the war. It is no secret that there is a clear disagreement between Egypt and France. France is more Arab than some of the Arab states. The Arab states are worried about the French stand. Egypt is particularly worried about this stand because the Arab states wish to see the Palestinian flame extinguished. The Palestinians have bypassed the international equation and force can destroy the Palestinian and Lebanese, who are gaining the profound respect and strong support throughout the world.

[Question] What is your opinion concerning the Soviet stand?

[Answer] I speak from my position as a Palestinian and say that the extent of Soviet activity in the battle, whether political or military, was not what it could have been. I only mention this and don't wish to suggest anything.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO'S ABU IYAD 'EXCLUSIVE' INTERVIEW FOR 'VJESNIK'

AU161344 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jul 82 pp 1, 2

["Exclusive" interview with Salah Khalaf, head of the PLO Security Department, by Dobrica Pivnicki in Beirut--no date given]

[Text] Beirut--Aby Iyad, second man in the PLO and head of its Security Department, has received VJESNIK's special reporter in Beirut in an office located in a deserted and half-destroyed house in west Beirut. However, although the Palestinian leader was prepared to grant the interview, it was not easy to reach him for the simple reason that your reporter had to make his way through a hail of bullets which the Israelis were firing at neighboring buildings.

[Question] Comrade Abu Iyad, how do you assess the current military and political situation in Beirut and Lebanon?

[Answer] The brutal Israeli Hitlerite invasion of Lebanon was aimed at destroying the PLO's military and political strength. Today is the 38th day of this invasion, and the Israelis have still not achieved their goal. As you have been able to see yourself, the fighting is going on not only in Beirut but throughout Lebanon. The Sunday bombing has not caused the casualties among us as could have been expected. Seven of our fighters were killed, but the civilian population suffered most. That bombing was supposed to have scared us, weaken our morale, but as you can see, they have not succeeded in this. On the contrary, our fighters responded in such a way that even the Israelis admitted their great losses. I believe that they were surprised by the violence of our response. As for the political situation, the PLO is making efforts for a peaceful solution under the auspices of the international forces. We want a real and full guarantee for the lives of civilians. Negotiations can be considered solely with the Lebanese Government. As far as the Israeli conditions are concerned, we reject them completely. However, I must say that despite the constructive initiatives, such as the French one, the situation has not yet been completely clarified. We are expecting new proposals.

[Question] An extraordinary session of the Coordination Bureau of the non-aligned countries will be held in Cyprus on 15 July. What does PLO expect at the present moment from the Nonaligned Movement?

[Answer] We expect certain specific steps. We primarily believe that the nonaligned countries will support positive initiatives and the fact that the multinational forces should be under the UN auspices. We also expect that all the nonaligned countries will condemn the Israeli aggression and begin with a number of economic, political and diplomatic boycotts of Israel, as well as that they will support a peaceful political solution within the UN framework. I believe that this is not much and the PLO will not demand anything else of the nonaligned countries.

[Question] Could you tell us something more about the USSR activities in connection with the Israeli aggression?

[Answer] We have recently expressed our anguish over the slowness of the USSR. We consider the socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union, as our good friends. However, in our current situation, the USSR has surprised us with its slowness. We are convinced that the USSR has a very clear picture as to what is happening here and for this reason the absence of a Soviet action confuses us. However, I must say that the battle is still not over and that the Soviet Union may still act.

[Question] What about the Arab reactions?

[Answer] Regrettably, this reaction is very poor. There is no real and honest attempt being made in the Arab world to help us in our current situation.

[Question] According to many current evaluations, the Israeli aggression against Lebanon represents an extension of the Camp David agreement. Israel has named its current operation as peaceful because, as it says, it strives toward establishing peace in Galilee. What kind of Israeli peace should be built on the ashes of the Palestinian problem?

[Answer] You are right when you speak about Camp David. In the first place we are paying the price for this agreement. However, we are also paying for the stability of the Arab regimes. And that is not all: We are also paying the price for the Iraq-Iran war. While others in this region measure their relations in kilometers, what bit of land should belong to whom and how much land, in their view, should belong to them, we ourselves do not speak about kilometers, but rather how much we can give away, and we also measure how much we can or may lose in the current situation.

[Question] In the al-Biqa' Valley there are many Palestinian volunteers from all over the world. The Syrian forces are also there. Could you describe the political and military situation in that very important region?

[Answer] Some 15,000 reservists from all over the world have responded to our appeal. Most of these reservists are in the al-Biqa' Valley. In al-Biqa' the Israelis deceived the Syrians to the same extent as the Americans deceived the Soviets. Namely, long before the invasion it was known that the invasion would take place. It was also known how far the Israeli forces could advance. However, it appears that the USSR and the Syrians calculated wrongly. The Israelis advanced beyond the envisaged positions and have also seized the

mountainous high land and have reached Beirut. This led to a collapse of the Syrian line. And now the Syrians are building a new line and for the reason our units in al-Biqa' do not have any freedom of movement. We believe that within the next few days the Syrians will fortify their new positions, and thus our fighters will obtain greater freedom of movement.

[Question] After 38 days of the war has the PLO won a number of important political points?

[Answer] That is correct. The condemnations of Israel and the recognitions of the Palestinian struggle have never been so numerous. Let us take, for instance, only the EEC condemnation. Then, for the first time ever a British foreign secretary received Faruq Qaddumi. Mitterrand ought to have talks with Qaddumi soon. We also believe that the insane act of invasion has caused much more damage to the enemy than benefit. At the present moment the enemy has militarily surrounded Beirut, but it is quite certain that we have politically surrounded Tel Aviv. The demonstrations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are an evidence of this, and thousands of demonstrators are no joke.

[Question] Do you expect Beirut to be invaded?

[Answer] Yes, we expect this invasion. However, I must say that we are well prepared for their arrival. The price they will have to pay will be too high.

[Question] And in conclusion, your fighters say that Philip Habib, the U.S. president's envoy, is really Israel's best general. Do you agree with this assessment?

[Answer] Yes, certainly....

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

'AL-MUSTAQBAL' INTERVIEW WITH PLO'S AL-HASAN

JN111133 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 10 Jul 82 p 19

[AL-MUSTAQBAL correspondent Sulayman Nimr's interview with PLO's Khalid al-Hasan--date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] The Israelis are saying that they want to remove the Palestinians and Syrians from Lebanon and conclude a peace agreement with the Lebanese authorities. Will this be achieved?

[Answer] Following its invasion of Lebanon, the enemy began calling for a peace agreement with Lebanon that would be similar to the Camp David accords. The enemy claims that it has a common interest with the Lebanese--ending the Palestinian and Syrian presence. The United States and Israel, by asking for the departure of the Palestinians, claim that they are conveying Lebanese demands. The fact is that this is their excuse to wipe out the PLO. All the Lebanese people will soon suffer the circumstances of Israeli occupation. The independent spirit of the Lebanese will inevitably clash with the Israeli spirit of hegemony and arrogance. When this does occur, things will return to normal and a suitable atmosphere for a real Lebanese reconciliation will prevail that will lead to the establishment of a strong Lebanese national government. The Palestinians will then do their best to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and dignity. All this leads us to say that Israel's attempts to conclude a peace agreement with Lebanon will inevitably fail.

[Question] Palestinian proposals call for maintaining a symbolic Palestinian military presence. Some believe this to be a concession you have offered as a result of the military predicament you are in. I do not want to say the military defeat as some are saying?

[Answer] I say loudly and clearly that Israel has not scored a military victory and that the Palestinian revolution has not been defeated militarily. Such statements may come as a shock to many after Beirut has come under siege. This is so because the Palestinian forces follow guerrilla tactics and are not a regular army. Therefore, the conventional evaluation of victory and defeat does not apply to them. The Palestinian forces' task in their confrontation of the Zionist invasion is to inflict the heaviest possible losses on the enemy and this has been achieved beyond all expectations. The enemy losses were 16 times more than what it had calculated to lose in the battle. Although the PLO is under military siege in Beirut, it is daily achieving political victories.

[Question] But the revolution is besieged in Beirut?

[Answer] The siege of Beirut has occurred for two reasons: The first is that the Palestinian, Arab and Muslim volunteers failed to arrive at the battlefield on time and consequently failed to exploit the Israeli military deployment in the Lebanese mountains by transforming them into a military trap that would have doubled enemy losses.

The second reason is that reaching Beirut and tightening the siege were due to lack of any activity in some Lebanese areas to confront the Israeli moves for reasons varying between negative stands by some and welcoming stands by others. We can safely add another reason in that Israel was reassured that no Arab military moves would take place given the Arab differences which caused unbelievable shortcomings.

[Question] Why didn't you submit your proposals before the war?

[Answer] The absence of a strong Lebanese Government to reach an understanding with in addition to the absence of an agreement among the Lebanese themselves, not to mention the circumstances of the war in Lebanon prevented us from doing so. In any case, we are not here to talk about the past. What is important is that events have made it clear that the Palestinian resistance remains committed to its obligations, particularly when there is a clear Lebanese stand.

[Question] However, the departure of the revolution from Lebanon to other Arab countries and the cutting down to size of your activities and forces, does it not mean losing the military option?

[Answer] If some say that this means the cancellation of the military option, we refute this for the following reasons:

A. The Palestinian military forces cannot protect their military action with their heavy weapons and size except within the framework of a militant Arab atmosphere and an Arab stand of solidarity.

B. As for the Palestinian military struggle, it will cease only if the resolutions of the Palestine National Council on the Establishment of the Palestinian State are achieved. This struggle must proceed form two bases: The struggle of the Palestinian people inside the homeland and the need to escalate it and the pursuit of our underground action which is not restricted by borders or agreements with Arab countries.

I believe that the deteriorating Arab situation must lead to an intensification of the militant atmosphere in favor of the Palestinian cause. This will be one of the fruits of the current battle.

[Question] Does this mean a return to underground action?

[Answer] Feda'iyyin action means underground action. That's why we should consolidate this trend.

[Question] What will happen if the Palestinian proposals are not accepted?

[Answer] If the Palestinian proposals are not accepted and if Israel and the United States continue to insist on imposing their conditions on the Palestinian revolution, then fighting in Beirut becomes something that will be dictated by the dignity of the Arab nation, the Lebanese people, the Palestinian revolution and all human values.

[Question] How can you explain the USSR's stand on events?

[Answer] I cannot ask the USSR to adopt stands that are more advanced than Arab stands. On this occasion, I would like to say that not many months will pass before the Arabs realize the damage they will suffer as a result of their internecine fighting, their lack of solidarity and preparation for the confrontation of the Zionist enemy.

[Question] Will the PLO reassess its alliances, its strategy and tactics?

[Answer] This question and many others dictated by the current battle and its results will be a subject of study and evaluation. The Palestinian leadership will take decisions after the crisis ends and after this battle ends one way or another.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

FATAH'S KHALID AL-HASAN REJECTS WITHDRAWAL UNDER U.S. COVER

GF111220 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 10 Jul 82 p 1

[Text] Khalid al-Hasan told AL-ANBA' yesterday that there is deliberate distortion of the current negotiations in Beirut in the reports by the Israeli enemy, the United States and Western information media.

Al-Hasan affirmed that negotiations are being held in Lebanon between the PLO and the Lebanese Government on the measures to implement the agreements which are being concluded and that there is no difference between the PLO and Lebanon on the principles of agreement except on the measures and means to implement it, which are the subject of controversy. He said: In this regard, no one except the Lebanese authority constitutes a party for us; that is why the dialogue is bilateral and neither Syria nor the United States has taken any part in it.

On the negotiations on Beirut, Khalid al-Hasan said: What we are discussing is the disengagement between the Israeli invasion forces and the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces; we are determined that our forces will not make any withdrawal from Beirut without an actual international guarantee for the safety of the Western area, the national movement and the honorable Lebanese people, who have sided with us during the past years. Likewise, any discussion that will not guarantee the safety of the camps and our people in them is a sterile discussion which we will not hold with any one in land. [Sentence as published] brother Abu al-Sa'id added: That is why we rejected withdrawal under the U.S. or Israeli cover because we know how to fight; however, we do not accept leaving in defeat and humiliation for any reason whatsoever, and for this will fight until death.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

FATAH'S SALAH KHALAF ON LEBANON SITUATION

GF111243 Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIF in Arabic 11 Jul 82 pp 1, 15

[Dispatch from Beirut]

[Excerpt] Salah Khalaf, alias Abu Iyad, Fatah Central Committee member has noted that the Western information media campaign, which is circulating reports on a political solution to the Beirut crisis, is aimed at alleviating the pressure of the world public opinion, which is demanding the withdrawal of the Zionist invasion forces from Lebanon.

In an interview with AL-KHALIJ, Abu Iyad indicated that the campaign is aimed at preventing any international move designed to end the invasion through depicting the situation as if it were moving in the direction of reaching a solution. He added that an effective Arab move can be achieved through cutting down the flow of oil and withdrawing the Arab assets from U.S. banks. Abu Iyad indicated that there has been no change in the [Palestinian] stance and that capitulation in various forms is all that is discussed with the Palestinian resistance and that the Palestinian resistance rejects all these proposals, for it will continue fighting until martyrdom. He pointed out that he regards the message sent by Soviet leader Brezhnev to U.S. President Reagan as being so far the strongest position adopted by the Soviet Union during the current war. He added that this position is also associated with other unveiled issues. He described what is currently taking place in Lebanon as being a normal result of the Camp David accords. He said that the Egyptian participation in the latest French initiative is aimed at restraining the Egyptian public opinion. He stressed that the only fruitful position that can be taken by Egypt is to sever its ties with the Zionist enemy and annual Camp David.

On the role of the other Arab countries, Abu Iyad said that they allowed the arrival of 15 thousand volunteers in Lebanon, most of whom were Palestinians, in order to take part in the battle. He continued that the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces views the Arab move as being futile unless it is accompanied by an oil embargo and the withdrawal of Arab assets from U.S. banks. He added that the Syrian forces in Beirut fight alongside the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces, but they are still under the Syrian command. He denied that these forces have been merged with the Palestinian command forces.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

VCP ON FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS IN GAZA STRIP

NC020805 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 0645 GMT 2 Jul 82

[Text] Reports from the occupied land say that our groups operating in the Khan Yunis area are intensifying their efforts to strike at the enemy forces' foot and mechanized patrols in the occupied Gaza Strip. On 8 June, one of our groups hurled a molotov cocktail at a patrol vehicle of the [word indistinct] type, which was patrolling the main street of the city opposite the [name indistinct] mosque. A number of soldiers were injured and the enemy detained scores of Khan Yunis youths.

On 9 June, just as darkness fell, one of our combat groups ambushed an armored vehicle that was patrolling the main Gaza-Khan Yunis Road near the crossroads of the camps of Nusayrat and al-Burayj. The group and the enemy soldiers exchanged gunfire. Our men damaged the vehicle and killed its crew. The group returned safely to base. Following this operation, enemy forces imposed a curfew on both camps, combed the area and uprooted the grove of trees in the area.

On 12 June, the occupation authorities in the city tried by force to drive the Arab workers to their workplaces in the land occupied in 1948. In retaliation for this, one of our groups damaged a bus near (?Mazlaqan) and the railway on the Gaza-Khan Yunis Road. Following this, work stopped inside our occupied land.

On 15 June, the same group planted incendiary devices in the old bus garage opposite the railway in the direction of the [name indistinct] market. The devices damaged the egged buses used to take workers to the occupied land. On the same day, other groups planted an antivehicle mine on a dirt road near an army and police headquarters. The mine went off at about 2130 the same day under a half-tracked vehicle, damaging it and killing or injuring its crew.

Reports from the Gaza area say that operations are continuing. Between 15-22 June, our groups carried out the following operations:

1. Throwing a hand grenade at a patrol vehicle on 'Umar al-Mukhtar Street near the old municipality building, causing indirect injuries to its crew.

2. One of our groups hurled a handgrenade at a military jeep near the city's police center on al-Shuja'iyah Road, killing 7 enemy soldiers.
3. One of our groups hurled a handgrenade at a military vehicle on the Jabalya circle near the Jabalya area, killing or injuring its passengers.
4. One of our groups burned down two Zionist egged company buses in the al-Shuja'iyah area east of Gaza. The buses were going to take Arab workers who had refused to work in the Zionist entity.

The occupation forces deliberately use a blackout against Palestinian military operations and the movement of the masses sweeping the Gaza villages and cities.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

FRIENDSHIP WITH USSR STRESSED--In a statement published today in the Beirut newspaper AL-NAHAR, Salah Khalaf, alias Abu Iyad, Fatah Central Committee member, stated that the USSR is a friend of the Palestinians and that great hopes are pinned on it regardless of the circumstances and the fact that some Arab states prevent easy movement of the USSR on the ground. Abu Iyad said: Moscow is called on to move because this country, Lebanon, represents the vanguard of all the free men in the Arab nation. Abu Iyad praised the French stand and said that Paris is nobly standing by the Palestinians despite pressures on it. Abu Iyad asserted that the battle would continue. He told the joint forces in Lebanon: You are the ones who besiege the United States, Israel and the Arab silence, as he put [it]. [Text] [JN161434 Monte Carlo Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic 1400 GMT 16 Jul 82]

DISARMING OF PLO REJECTED--Damascus, 1 Jul (SANA)--Palestine National Council [PNC] speaker Khalid al-Fahum told a group of Polish journalists yesterday that the PLO cannot be an unarmed political entity. Replying to a question by WAFA about current rumors concerning the possibility of disarming the PLO, AL-FAHUM said that this decision concerns the Palestinian leadership in Beirut, but their decision, which was announced several times, was to fight and remain steadfast until victory. Replying to a question about the prospects of establishing the Palestinian state in the present circumstances, AL-FAHUM said: We never said that we would establish our state today or tomorrow. But we are certain that it will be established one day with the cooperation of the Arab masses. AL-FAHUM stressed that in the battle of defending our existence, we must use all the resources of the Palestinian people, including the students. He added: This is a battle of existence, and we are honored that our students are joining in the battle. There is no fear about the future of the Palestinian generations in this regard. [Text] [JN012055 Damascus SANA in Arabic 2005 GMT 1 Jul 82]

CSO: 4400/372

UNIVERSITY CHART ENDORSED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 31 May 82 p 12

[Article: "University Chart--the Link with Development"]

[Text] The Algerian university, taking on importance and scope after 2 decades of development, is experiencing today the need for expansion and transformation in order to respond better to the realities of economic and social development of the country, and in particular, to those of the regions where the universities are established.

Since independence, the needs in the area of training of skilled personnel have been modified or have changed. Higher-level training has developed very rapidly in Algeria, especially since application of the university reform (1971). Institutes, university centers, new establishments of higher education, offices and research centers, and even new universities, have partly or totally opened their doors to an ever larger number of students.

At the opening of the 1981-1982 academic year, 21 universities (Algiers, Oran, Constantine, Annaba, Tlemcen, Setif, Tizi-Ouzou, Blida, Batna, Tiaret, Sidi Bel-Abbes, Mostaganem, Tebessa, Oum El-Bouaghi, Guelma, Bejaia, Biskra, M'Sila, Bechar, Laghouat and Chlef) took in nearly 86,000 students. At independence, there was only one university center, Algiers, with the University of Algiers-Center, the Polytechnical School and the National Agronomic Institute of El-Harrach, with a total capacity on the order of 5,000 to 6,000 student places. It proved imperative to adapt the university to the realities and exigencies of national development. The preparation and implementation of the university chart answers to this necessity.

Examined and adopted by the Council of Ministers yesterday, the new university chart presented by the minister of higher education and scientific research is based on the National Charter, the resolutions of the congress of the FLN, and the decisions of the Central Committee.

On this basis and in conformity with the presidential orientations, the restructuring envisioned is based on the following major axes: the policy of regional balance; reorganization of the courses of study for better coverage of the needs for skilled personnel; strengthening of technical and specialized education, in which there are big shortages; specialization of the new training

structures as institutes of national or broad regional vocation in function of the country's development needs; Algerianization of the teaching personnel; the needs induced by the changeover from technical assistance, etc.

The working-out of this chart therefore rests on an approach that takes into account the upgrading of higher training and the cadre needs implied by development, with the necessity of a long-term plan (20 years), and the necessary coherence of the university's development in close liaison with the development of training in general, on its different levels of education: fundamental, vocational, secondary and higher.

The working-out and implementation of the university chart, conceived as the judicious distribution of the institutions of higher-level training over the national territory and definition of the profiles and types of training with a view to ensuring coverage, in a satisfactory manner, of the country's needs for cadres, on both the quantitative and qualitative levels, is a complex matter.

The studies carried out for more than 6 years with a view to establishing a university chart have led, on the basis of the estimates of cadres and job positions for the various economic and social sectors, to the programming of training structures. The preliminary plan submitted to the Council of Ministers by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in February and September 1981 led to certain readjustments with reference to the estimates of cadre need (for the period of the 5-Year Plan, the Algerian university has to train 178,000 higher-level cadres), the development needs and certain factors that permit a long-term approach and satisfaction of the needs, coordination between the university and the user sectors [as published].

An interministerial commission was created in September 1981 to refine the proposed university chart. Until last week, this commission concentrated on orienting the proposal in the direction of objective integration of it with the socioeconomic realities of the country and determining the needs, the specialization, the hierarchy of priorities, the size, location and type of the training structures, the times needed for construction, etc. The results obtained by the interministerial commission were presented to the government yesterday, in the Council of Ministers, while the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, for its part, has implemented an action program for applying the decisions already reached and the decisions to follow.

The new university chart, for the horizon of the year 2000, is aimed at orienting and channeling the development of the Algerian university and integrating it with the development of the country. Extension of the university to the different regions of the country, within the framework of the policy of decentralization, meets the twofold need to disencumber the big traditional centers (with more than 80 percent of the numbers of people and of the education dispensed) and to raise the wilayas of the interior to the level of higher training. This orientation requires the taking of decisions that make it possible to overcome the distortions presently encountered: a strong predominance of the social and exact sciences over all other disciplines, insufficient liaison and complementarity among the various cycles of education, weaknesses in organizational framework or teacher-training, the university's failure to control the

flows of students arriving each year, etc. It also requires rigorous planning in order to remedy the insufficiencies existing in the present structures.

After noting the distortions in the present chart and the imbalances in the higher-training system and reviewing the constituent phases of the present university chart, the Council of Ministers decided on the major axes of the necessary readjustment as fixed by the political bodies.

The government has set the orientations by which the readjustments are to be implemented by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. It is up to the latter to work out the practical modalities for application of the adjustments, to determine the means required, and to propose specific dates for the stages of application.

It is stressed by the document presented to the Council of Ministers that correct elaboration of a very long-term university chart must have the major axes of national development as its point of departure. This basic liaison between higher-level training and the exigencies of economic and social development is aimed essentially at adaptation of university output to the country's needs for cadres, rational utilization of the human resources, and finally, the elaboration of the levels of production and productivity. A policy of economic and social development such as that defined by the National Charter and detailed by the various resolutions adopted by the last two congresses of the Party and the sessions of the Central Committee is necessarily and first of all dependent on a policy of training at all levels, and particularly at the level of the upper-level cadres.

In this regard, a rigorous and detailed balancing of the cadre needs and of the capacities, installed and to be installed, in order to guarantee satisfactory coverage of the needs necessary for the development projected proves indispensable within the framework of the in-depth elaboration of the university chart.

Since the insufficiency of the infrastructures due to construction delays and the weakness of the university system's output are also to be noted, "the university system has the mission of providing for 90 percent of the coverage of the country's needs for cadres, with the remainder covered by the institutions coming under the other ministries," which risk compromising the proposed economic and social development [as published] and putting off indefinitely the phasing-out of the technical-assistance regime.

The new university chart takes into consideration the higher-level training provided by the specialized technical ministries (the number of students outside the MERS [Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research] is currently estimated at about 7,000), and it also takes account of the training obtained abroad (more than 5,500 students in post-graduate and graduate training).

11267
CSO: 4519/200

EGYPT

BRIEFS

RELIGIOUS NEWSPAPER RESUMES PUBLICATION--The [Coptic] newspaper WATANI will resume publication this coming 1 August. The publication of WATANI was suspended according to a decree of last September along with other religious and opposition newspapers. The publishers of WATANI took their case to the Administrative Cases Tribunal in the Council of State which nullified the decree preventing its publication. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 12 Jul 82 p 1]

'AL-DA'WAH' RESUMES PUBLICATION--Lawyer Muhammad Khamis has put Interior Minister Maj Gen Hasan Abu Pasha on notice about implementing the decision of the south Cairo court on the return [to publication] of the [Muslim Brotherhood] magazine AL-DA'WAH which was suspended last September. The south Cairo court had issued a decision nullifying the decree canceling the permit of the magazine, according to the appeal of the editor-in-chief, 'Umar al-Talmasani. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 12 Jul 82 p 1]

CSO: 4500/239

ISRAEL

ISRAEL URGED TO OFFER POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE TO PALESTINIANS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Jun 82 p 9

[Article by Yirmiyahu Yuval: "The Palestinian Problem Exists"]

[Text] There will continue to be arguments over the conduct of the war in Lebanon. The public will continue to hear about things and actions which the communications media concealed from it but which the people at the front saw and heard. There will continue to be reports on the details of cabinet meetings and the methods of making decisions and expanding on them.

However, unrelated to all this, there are few Israelis who will regret the severe blow which the PLO has suffered. It is an enemy organization in the full sense of the term which is plotting against both the existence of Israel as a state and the lives of its citizens. It invited upon itself the blow which has struck it. This is an achievement for Israel.

However, the achievement is a temporary one, and the root of the problem has not been addressed. The PLO with all its murderousness expresses a prevalent national consciousness and the collective will of a people which is seeking a homeland. This is a fundamental fact of our existence in the Land of Israel, and it cannot be changed by military means. Regardless of the extent to which Israel crushes the limbs of the PLO, it will not succeed in erasing the consciousness of the people in back of it. Our problem, therefore, is a political one.

After the IDF action in Lebanon the danger of intoxication with deceptive force which we knew after the Six-Day War once again hovers over Israel. Once again the delusion is sprouting that the activation of power is in itself a policy. It seems that everyone today is talking about an integrated military and political process. However, both of them are understood as components of a power policy only. The concept of "political process" here has only a narrow and tactical connotation. It is the diplomatic arm of the power structure. The role of policy is not to draw an outline for a more lasting settlement but is only to translate the military gains into new strategic advantages.

This means that Israel is building its strength and using it in order to strengthen itself again and again. However, one must also ask: For what additional objective? For which plan designed to reach a settlement will it use

this strength? More specifically, what will we try to achieve in terms of a settlement in the Palestinian context after we have struck such a devastating blow against the PLO?

It seems that the Government of Israel has no response to this. This is not because no one has thought about it but rather that the principle which guides the government is the denial of every political option to the Palestinian people and the closing of all its political horizons without exception. The Likud government has already stated openly that the permanent solution which it is offering to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is annexation to Israel. This means that the Palestinians have been sentenced to political despair, the lack of an alternative, and to a cul-de-sac. Even the autonomy as it has been offered to them today is only a fiction designed to prepare for the annexation.

This is an approach of pure power, the use of the superior strength of Israel not for the purpose of solving the basic problem in a suitable way but rather to break and crush for a certain time the strength of the adversary. The basic assumption of this approach is that it is Israel's fate to endure a 100-year war against all the Arab peoples and from time to time, according to the circumstances, the Arabs must be split. They must be attacked selectively, and a temporary agreement must be reached with some while the others must be crushed concurrently. In other words, constant war. This is a fatalistic approach because it despairs of Israel's ability to use its strength to influence its future and primarily because in such a constant struggle, Israel has no great prospect for surviving. The war fatalist understands the great historical event known as the State of Israel as a kind of continuing Masada epic which is conducted in several campaigns and over several generations. We will fight, we will fight, and we will fight again--this is his story of heroism. However, will we always fight and will we always be able to?

The struggle against the PLO is necessary and justified. However, there is a difference of day and night between a blow against the PLO which leaves it no alternative (except the extermination of the Palestinian people and the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Israel) and a blow against the PLO which will be accompanied by a proposal to the Palestinian people to recognize Israel and to join with it in a political compromise. Even if the current PLO leadership does not agree to any kind of settlement, it is likely to cause a stir in the Palestinian camp including the West Bank and encourage the creation of a more moderate Palestinian leadership which will learn the lesson of the PLO moderate Palestinian leadership which will learn the lesson of the PLO extremism and at the same time will have the confidence and trust of its citizens--as distinguished from the puppet leadership which the government of Israel has recently endeavored to cultivate.

The war against the PLO has been declared on two parallel fronts: a political war in the West Bank (which has caused unrest and bloodshed) and a military war in Lebanon. In these two arenas, we have paid a high price: a price of blood, combat dead, an economic burden in Lebanon and a heavy moral and propaganda

price in both sectors. What else will we draw from this besides the easing of the situation on the northern border? The attack on the PLO can serve as a stimulus for the advancement of peace were Israel to concurrently offer a political alternative to the Palestinians which would bring their moderate representation together with Jordan to the negotiating table. However, if all that is said to the Palestinians is: destroy yourselves, commit suicide, leave Lebanon also, and it is our intention to annex the entire West Bank in the future, then Israel does not leave them any political future and is declaring war not only on the PLO as a murderous and chauvinistic organization but also on the Palestinian people as such. As such, it is Israel which is playing the role of an extremist and rejectionist element. This position will not stimulate among the Palestinians moderation, a willingness for reconciliation or a substitute leadership in the territories but only despair, bitterness, continuous terror, and perpetual war.

The establishment of a Palestinian identity, separate or within the framework of Jordan, is not so unreasonable in terms of the international configuration. There is no country in the world, including the United States, which does not believe that such an identity is a prerequisite for stability and a new balance in our region. The only question is if all the parties are interested in such a stability.

Public opinion in Israel is mostly opposed to a Palestinian identity, and there is only a minority which believes that in certain circumstances the establishment of such an identity will be a great historical gain for Israel. However, one thing is clear: there is a profound difference between a Palestinian identity which would emerge with the approval of Israel and after negotiations with it and a Palestinian state which would emerge against the will of Israel and with the coercion of the rest of the world. A Palestinian state which would be established under these conditions would indeed be a danger to Israel, and the extremists among us who are opposed to any form of Palestinian identity, even within the framework of Jordan, are perhaps preparing the ground for the worst case which worries them.

After the blows which the PLO has absorbed, the Israeli interest is to offer the Palestinian people a political alternative. We must say to them: As long as your position is the PLO rejection and your objective is to destroy us, we will, we will speak with the language of the sword. However, look where the PLO is today and where its way has led. If you recognize us and agree to live alongside us, you will find that we are also prepared to recognize you and your right to a national life. In other words, we are open to a partition of the complete Land of Israel between our two peoples in accordance with the accords and borders which will be determined in negotiations.

The partners to such negotiations will be Israel, Jordan, and every representative Palestinian element which will express a desire for an accord. Such an element can be the PLO itself, if it will moderate its position and agree to coexist with Israel, or a competitive leadership which will emerge in the West Bank, if Israel offers them a real political future. Such a future can be anchored initially in the Camp David Agreements, and it is desirable from the Israeli point of view that it involve Jordan. This does not necessarily mean

instant and immediate peace. Gradual transition stages will be required. However, the foundation for the peace process with the Palestinians must be laid now and precisely when the PLO rejectionist policy which has controlled them up to now is in critical condition.

We mourn our dead, we are recovering from the shock of war, we are rejoicing in the relaxation of the situation in the Galilee, and we are looking ahead. The losses which we suffered, the destruction and death which we sowed in Lebanon, the large-scale invasion which we launched far beyond the security area of the Galilee will have a reason only if it is not just another passing episode in a perpetual war, if it will serve as a stimulus for an accord also in the focal point of the problem, in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which we will reach with Jordan and with the moderate but trusted representatives of the Palestinian people. For this purpose, Israel must, along with the sword, offer the Palestinian people also the fig leaf and give it an honorable way out and a national and political expression which will be compatible with our existence. Are we capable of this? Do we have the boldness to exploit the moment for such a turning point and overcome the seductions of zealotry and power intoxication? The heart wants to hope even though the mind refuses to believe.

5830
CSO: 4423/182

WEST BANK VIEWS OF PLO, LEBANON OPERATION DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Jun 82 p 15

[Article by Dani Rubinstein: "War Is Better Than Stalemate and Silence"]

[Text] At first it seemed to me to be rather foolish to come today to Palestinians in the West Bank and ask them what was new and how they were feeling. What kinds of responses could there be to such questions? A staff officer in the military administration told me this week that now it will be possible to implement much more easily the plans of the civilian administration and now that the PLO has been virtually eliminated from its centers in Lebanon, it is reasonable to assume that its supporters in the West Bank will also be weakened and their status and strength will decline. Far from the events in Lebanon, the Israeli administration in the territories is indeed continuing these days to attempt to impose its plans. In Nablus, where the mayor has been expelled, the members of the City Council have again been requested to cooperate with the civilian administration. Also in Dura, the municipality has been requested to end the boycott which it has imposed on the civilian administration. In the two cases, the municipalities have refused, and in Dura the members of the City Council have been fired. In Nablus there have been several incidents. A youth who was throwing stones was killed, and the local university, Al Najah, has been closed. In East Jerusalem there was a 1-day business strike, and distribution restrictions have been reimposed on the Arab newspapers which struck at the beginning of the week as a sign of protest.

After not having visited East Jerusalem for 10 days (from the beginning of the battles), in the middle of the week I visited the Arab newspapers and met several Arab acquaintances. The impression I received was different than that which I had expected. I had thought that in Ramallah and Bethlehem the residents would be more disconcerted and fearful, but such was not the case. A teacher from East Jerusalem with whom I had a telephone conversation told me: "Why should we be afraid? You have already conquered us once and you have already annexed us once. What will you do? Will you conquer us again and annex us again?"

Later I met 'Ali al-Khalili, a resident of Nablus, who is the literary editor of AL-FAJR (which presents the views of the PLO), and he said to me that in general there is no depression in the West Bank and the feeling is not

so bad. "How is that possible?" I asked. He responded: "Every war and every victory of the State of Israel since 1967 has only been to our benefit. In the war of June 1967 and in the Karameh battle afterwards, the PLO was recognized and firmly established. After the October war, the PLO received its greatest impetus. It was accepted into the United Nations, it was recognized as the exclusive representative of the Palestinians (Rabat Conference), and so forth. The PLO managed to turn the Litani operation into its own major victory. This time there are good prospects that after this war, the Palestinians and the PLO will become a political entity which will be a partner in all of the negotiations and talks for a new settlement."

I told 'Ali al-Khalili that after the campaign in Lebanon it is doubtful if there will still be a PLO because its institutions and its entire military infrastructure have been destroyed, and as such, who will give it any consideration? He believes otherwise. According to him, it has been proven so far that military force cannot destroy the PLO since it represents a true national problem. "Who has not attacked the Palestinians?" says Al-Khalili. "The Jordanian army in 1970, the secret services of Egypt and Iraq, the Syrian army in Tall Za'tar, and yet the PLO has survived and become stronger, and its leadership and institutions have remained." In his opinion, even the campaign and battles to date have not been a major defeat for the PLO. Even now, with the conquest of southern Lebanon, more Israeli soldiers have been killed than in the conquest of the entire West Bank in 1967. Opposing the IDF in the West Bank then was an organized Jordanian army which was several times stronger than the Palestinians and PLO in southern Lebanon. "You are only becoming embroiled in Lebanon, and you will not know how to extricate yourself from there," he says.

If the IDF seizes the PLO centers in Beirut and destroys the Palestinian leadership there, what will happen then? Al-Khalili's response was quick and clear: "It means nothing. In Algeria also, the French seized the entire underground leadership in an aircraft and took them prisoner. Others took their place."

I was surprised to discover this week another series of reactions which seem to me to represent rather faithfully the moods of Palestinian pride. The Arab community in the territories is convinced that the statistics which the IDF is reporting about Israeli losses are false and the number of Israeli dead is much larger. In a coffeehouse at the entrance to Nablus, I was told that the Palestinian opposing forces are proving themselves. They are defending themselves with strength and honor and are fighting, not fleeing, not to northern Lebanon and not to Syria.

The newspapers and the street are full of angry reactions and scorn against their brother Arabs and the Arab countries who are doing nothing. An editorial in AL-QUDS this week begins with the following: "The great nation which extends from the Gulf to the Ocean and calls itself Arab is doing nothing as if the issue does not concern it." I also heard criticism of Syria which agreed to a cease-fire and abandoned the Palestinians.

"Despite the destruction and the losses, the situation is not so terrible," says a lawyer from Ramallah, a PLO sympathizer, whom I asked if he is not

worried that the Israeli struggle against the Palestinian organizations will also lead to an expulsion of the heads of the PLO in the territories. "Where will they expel us?" he asks and immediately responds: "At one time the Israeli administration used to expel us to Jordan, however they have stopped. Jordan and King Husayn are rather convenient for Israel. You do not want to cause problems for the regime there and send them more and more pro-PLO Palestinians. It is also no longer possible to expel to Lebanon." His conclusion in light of the events of recent years is that whenever Israel takes a much stronger action against the Palestinians and whenever the Palestinian problem goes on the agenda in a harsher and more cruel form, the more the entire world understands that it is a problem which must be solved. In order to provide a basis for his comments, he says that he does not care if Israel occupies all of Lebanon and even the area east of the Jordan which is part of Palestine. Then a few more difficult years will pass, but the Palestinian national problem will have to be solved. "There is a war," he says, "there is opposition, there is attention, there are problems. This is proof that there is a Palestinian people and a Palestinian movement. This is what the PLO is seeking. The main point is that they do not sweep us into a corner, under the rug. Stalemate and silence on the Palestinian issue are a thousand times worse than war. It is impossible to destroy all of us."

When I summarized the moods in the West Bank this week, I saw an interesting picture: it is precisely the youth, the radicals, the PLO supporters who are rather satisfied. In contrast, those who are called moderates and traditionalists are depressed and disconcerted. A compromise solution, in their opinion, is becoming more remote.

5830
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ISRAELI ARAB REACTIONS TO LEBANON SITUATION ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Jun 82 p 11

[Article by 'Atallah Mansur: "Arabs of the Galilee: Brothers Under Fire"]

[Text] In all of Israel's campaigns the Israeli Arabs have been caught in the middle, between their civic obligation which requires them to be loyal to the state on one hand and their natural sympathy for their people and their Arab culture on the other. This conflict has always weighed heavily upon them. However, Operation Peace for the Galilee has brought this pressure to a peak unprecedented since the War of Liberation.

Operation Kadesh in 1956 took place in the Sinai Peninsula, and only an insignificant minority among the Arabs in Israel had family members in Egypt. This generally ameliorated the psychological distress of the Arab community in Israel during those days. The Six-Day War was a short and all-encompassing war between Israel and all the Arab countries. It was generally fought by regular armies, a fact which had a calming effect on the Arab citizen of Israel because his brothers across the border were virtually unrepresented in the Arab armies. Furthermore, the ties created in the wake of this war between the Arabs of Israel and their brothers in the villages of the West Bank sweetened the pill and allayed to some extent the feelings of frustration. This is because there are many family ties among the residents of Talyiba, Tulkarm, Umm al-Fahm, Janin, Tirah, Qalqilyah, and the other places on both sides of the Green Line.

Even the Yom Kippur War did not bring the pressure on the Arabs of Israel to the boiling point. The fact that the armies of Egypt and Syria scored successes in the early stages of the war and that units of the Arab armies of Morocco, Iraq, and Jordan joined the war on the side of the Syrian army and that Sudan, Kuwait and Algeria provided aid to the Egyptian army infused this war, from the perspective of the Arabs in Israel, with a dramatic character. The ideas of Arab unity appeared close to realization. The stalemate in the results of the war gave many the feeling that henceforth they would not be an object of maltreatment by their fellow-workers returning from the front. This war also, like its predecessors--except for the War of Liberation--was a classic war between soldiers and armies, and this made it "easy" to understand. A short time later, when the disengagement talks were held between the forces, and the settlements--and of course, the peace with Egypt--the bitter memories were gradually forgotten.

Operation Peace for the Galilee has reopened the wound. The inhabitants of the refugee camps in southern Lebanon, the names of which the television correspondents and those of Kil Yisrael [Voice of Israel] find difficult to pronounce, are only the relatives of the Arabs of Galilee. Most of the Arab citizens of Israel in the Galilee have relatives in the refugee camps of this region. Last week many frightened faces were seen on television, however among the Arab viewers there were many whose hearts were wrenched when they observed the face of an old man or youth which reminded them of a relative whom they have not seen for many years and whom they knew was living in that area.

The shock from Operation Peace for the Galilee was great also for other reasons. The operation was conducted clearly on Israeli initiative and targeted against the PLO which maintains its bases in the refugee camps (in which, as has been stated, there are relatives of many of the Arabs of Israel). Secondly, the operation came after a year's quiet in the wake of a cease-fire agreement between the PLO and Israel. This led many to believe that it was the beginning of a process of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO because many Arabs in Israel tend to believe that the PLO is prepared to establish peaceful relations with Israel in exchange for Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The RAKAH newspapers reported this consistently from the time when official and public meetings were held between representatives of RAKAH and the PLO in early May 1977. Many Arabs in Israel have therefore placed the blame on the absence of peace between Israel and the Palestinians on the Government of Israel which refuses to negotiate with the PLO "which is prepared to establish peace with Israel." This week I asked a successful and moderate businessman if he contributed to the campaign to raise funds for the IDF. He told me that he was not asked to do so, and had they asked him, he would have refused because in his opinion the IDF soldiers "are conducting a campaign to exterminate the Palestinian people." Those who were present, about 10 in number, agreed with him. The members of the committee which was collecting contributions in Nazaret for the IDF did their work without publicity and press coverage at the request of the contributors. There was a time in 1967 when in Nazaret there was a line to contribute blood and collect blankets and transistors for IDF soldiers.

However, it is not only against the Government of Israel that the Arabs of Israel vent their anger. They condemn no less the Arab world in general and the Syrians in particular for abandoning the Palestinians, the United States which, in their opinion, encourages Israel, and the Soviet Union which is not assisting the Palestinians after having promised them many times that it would do so. Nevertheless, the anger of the Arabs of Israel has not been expressed publicly. In Jersualem 20 or 30 Arab students participated in a demonstration of leftists (most of whom were Jews), and in Nazaret unknown persons painted slogans on the walls of the municipal cultural center and on the wall of the municipal high school. The RAKAH issued a statement condemning the war in Lebanon and calling for peace based on mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinians, however a protest assembly which it organized in Friendship House only attracted hundreds of people. The police did not intervene except for notifying the organizers of the meeting that loudspeakers were not to be placed on the roof.

In general, the war in the north has not caused any serious disruptions in the daily lives of the Arabs in Israel. They go to work as usual. There has been no panic hoarding of food, and there have been no preventive detentions among them in the "tradition" of the previous wars.

5830
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JORDAN

BRIEFS

AQABA PORT 'UNUSUALLY BUSY'--Elat, 10 Jul (ITIM)--The Jordanian port of 'Aqaba has been unusually busy with ship movements in recent days, as on 9 and 10 July 60 ships were counted from various countries and of all types. An ITIM correspondent says that the number of ships waiting to enter the port is so great that some of them have anchored just beside the port of Elat and some have spread out along the bay as far south as Coral Island. According to one assessment the concentration of such a large number of ships in the Port of 'Aqaba stems mainly from the total paralysis of the Port of Beirut and from Iraq's need for supplies and equipment through that port. It should be noted that among the vessels are modern container ships from the United States and Western Europe alongside ships from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. [Text] [TA102144 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 2120 GMT 10 Jul 82]

CSO: 4400/372

KUWAIT

KUWAITI DAILY ON REAGAN, SHULTZ REMARKS

GF141430 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 14 Jul 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Beyond Arab Phenomena!"]

[Text] Amid the darkness of despair resulting from the "outward signs" of Arab affairs, indications make their way to the surface that "some sort of a solution" to the Palestinian question and Lebanese crisis "is underway." It is unreasonable that 21 Arab countries have agreed to abandon the Palestinian cause and avoid a stand that would lift the Israeli occupation of half of Lebanon without "burying" the Palestinian revolution. Moreover, we cannot explain King Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz's affirmation to his cabinet that "U.S. President Ronald Reagan has shown response regarding the situation in Lebanon to an extent calling for optimism" and "that Israel will not achieve its goal of liquidating the Palestinian cause"--unless there is "some sort" of U.S. guarantee to the Saudi monarch, a guarantee which responds to some extent to the Palestinians' legitimate rights.

The United States is a superpower that has interests in the Arab world and cannot risk these interests for the sake of Israel's expansionist dreams. Also, the sturdy Palestinian steadfastness in Beirut against the gigantic U.S.-Israeli war machine has proved to Washington that the PLO is "not just a terrorist movement with the aim of killing and sabotage" but a liberation movement representing a people willing to be completely destroyed but who will not give up their legitimate rights to their occupied homeland.

This belief is supported by the statement George Shultz made before the foreign relations committee of the U.S. Senate yesterday. In this statement which obtained the committee's approval of his designation as secretary of state by President Reagan, Shultz said "the Israeli invasion of Lebanon clearly and painfully shows a main fact in the Middle East which is that the problems and legitimate needs of the Palestinian people should be promptly solved with their full dimensions" within the framework of Camp David.

From the Israeli threat to the resistance in Beirut and the success of the resistance in changing the siege of Beirut into a war of attrition against the Israeli forces, the United States has come out with a new equation responding to "the legitimate needs of the Palestinian people" and the necessities of "maintaining Israel's security" within the framework of Camp David and the "participation of Palestinian representatives."

Amid the resistance's current dilemma in Beirut--a situation created by the United States via the Israeli device--the U.S. solution seems to be the only one possible, taking into consideration the absence of the USSR from the Middle East scene.

In this dilemma the PLO was able to hold "successful negotiations with the United States." The PLO's show of readiness to withdraw from Beirut in return for U.S. recognition--as one Palestinian source in the Lebanese capital said--indicates that things are on the way to a solution, a solution that will not depart from the framework fo "full autonomy" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as Shultz said. However, the PLO alone has the right to give its opinion about this solution because its life is on the line and there is no other alternative.

CSO: 4400/372

KUWAIT

DECLINE IN KUWAITI OIL PRODUCTION REPORTED

LD151422 Kuwait KUNA in English 1215 GMT 15 Jul 82

[Text] Kuwait, 15 July (KUNA)--Kuwait's crude oil production in the third quarter of 1981 totalled around 0.95 million barrels a day as an average, a report by the Central Bank said.

The decline in production is due to Kuwait's continued application of the resolution fixing the ceiling of production (1.25 million barrels a day) and the continued decline in world demand for OPEC oil during that period, the quarterly statistical bulletin of the bank added.

The decelerated production of Kuwait crude oil in the third quarter of 1981 has had a direct effect on the decrease of production of natural gas (by around 21.6 percent), refined oil (2.8 percent), crude oil exports (by 30 percent) and refined products [words indistinct] (by 19.4 percent). [Words indistinct] and state facilities dropped by 22.3 percent and 22.5 percent respectively in 1981, the report added.

As a [word indistinct] of the development in natural production, the ratio of natural gas utilization to production rose to 91.1 percent the third quarter of 1981 compared to 85.5 percent in the corresponding period of the previous year, the report added.

Throughout the third quarter of 1981 oil prices [words indistinct] their level of the beginning of January (35.5 dollars per barrel of Kuwait oil 31 API), which means an increase of 12.7 percent over the average price for the third quarter of the previous year. Accordingly, the official price for Kuwait oil was reduced to 33 dollars a barrel beginning the 1st of November 1981, and to 32.3 dollars beginning the 1st of January 1982, the report added.

CSO: 4400/372

KUWAIT

KUWAIT DAILY NOTES SOVIET HOPE FOR GAINS FROM LEBANON CRISIS

LD291250 Kuwait KUNA in English 1106 GMT 29 Jun 82

[From the press review]

[Text] Kuwait, 29 June (KUNA)--AL-ANBA on the Soviet connivance:

"The Soviet Union wishes to draw a huge gain out of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that we hope would not be missed by the Arab intelligence. This Soviet gain is the annihilation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its leadership which refuses to throw itself in the Soviet [word indistinct].

"This gain is connected to a (?most) cunning and dangerous target. Moscow realizes the amount of rage, anger, and hatred that will spread all over the Arab world and among the Palestinian people in particular after the daggers plunged in their body relax and after the blood shed cools.... Moscow is betting on the growth of destructive (?cells) and their breeding everywhere in the Arab lands, a thing that would clear the way for communism which uses [word indistinct] as a tool. Moscow (as such is waiting to) reap the fruits in chaos and assassinations that would work to the benefit of Arab and international communism.

"Since the beginning" Moscow has approved the establishment of Israel and has facilitated the migration of hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews in the hope that those would remain communist as they were known to be in the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and would establish the first communist rule in the Middle East that would cause the disintegration of the Arab nation and the abandonment of its national faith. This Moscow belief will turn thing [as received] into horrible class and social struggle.

"The Soviet Union believes that Israel's creation will allow communism to find its way to many an Arab country. This is still valid but now it has been exposed. This makes it impossible to deny that Moscow has connived with Washington and Israel on the invasion and annihilation of the organization pushing the Palestinian people to a (?state) of despair that would carry them to the negotiations talbe. Their place there will not be that of a partner but below partner's seat beseeching mercy and forgiveness from their murderers."

CSO: 4400/372

KUWAIT

KUWAITI PAPER CONTRASTS 'FIGHTERS, SPECTATORS' IN MIDEAST

GF011710 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 1 Jul 82 p 1

[Editorial: "The Fighters in the Middle East"]

[Text] This is not the time to preach sermons and lessons to the Palestinian resistance, for revolutions are self-taught and they alone pay the price of the lessons they learn. The more important and serious question which the Palestinian revolution should answer in the future is: Why has everyone, its brothers, friends and allies, abandoned it in its ordeal?

In the time of national ordeal sweet facts disappear and only the bitter facts emerge. One of these bitter facts is that there are only three groups fighting in the Middle East for the homeland, while the rest are mere spectators or bettors. Those who are truly fighting for a homeland and are actually dying for it are the Palestinians, who are fighting to have a homeland, or to regain part of their homeland; the Lebanese, who are fighting to shape the homeland which they did not protect so it did not protect them; and the Israelis, who appear to be prepared to destroy the whole world, if necessary, to keep what they believe is their homeland.

As for the rest in the Middle East, they are the noncombatant Arabs, those who have withdrawn from the fighting on various pretexts, the impotent who did not prepare themselves with all their might, the prevaricators who fight only with bombastic rhetoric, and the treacherous who save their weapons to fight their brothers rather than their enemies.

Those who claim that the United States assists its ally Israel much more than the Soviet Union succors its Arab allies commit a great error. The difference between Israel and some Arabs is that Israel fights and does not ask the United States to fight on its behalf, whereas some Arabs do not fight and ask the Soviet Union to fight for them.

CSO: 4400/372

KUWAIT

NATIONAL BANK ISSUES REPORT ON ECONOMIC FUTURE

GF111213 Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 11 Jul 82 p 1

[Text] Kuwait, 10 July--Kuwait economy will have to readjust itself to lower levels of income and a slowdown in economic growth will inevitably follow, an authoritative report said here last week.

The downturn, largely spurred on by sharply declining oil revenues is expected to produce both benefits and drawbacks for the country, it is anticipated.

The report, published as an 'economic and financial quarterly 1982', by the National Bank of Kuwait [NBK], analyses the performance of several revenue contributing sectors and asserts that diversification away from almost total dependence on oil is imperative.

It cites the rapid growth of the country's financial institutions as an example of "their capability to contribute more aggressively in future to the gross domestic product (GDP)".

It also predicts that the government will resort to new 'revenue raising and conservation' measures, such as those announced in a decree on raised prices of petroleum products in April

All of the economic sectors in Kuwait will be affected, with the slowdown manifesting itself in varying degrees, the report says. The domestic stock market is expected to be hardest hit, with trading activity slowing down considerably. Recently announced intentions by the Iraqi government to reduce development spending will adversely affect re-export and contracting activities.

Emphasis in the manufacturing sector will be on improvement of productivity and better utilization while avoiding duplicity and over-expansion.

Meanwhile the construction sector has already been adversely hit with the number of new construction projects slipping steadily from a peak in the 1977/78 period. The sector will be faced with a continuing decline, largely to be explained by the completion of major infrastructure projects, reduced government spending and reduced profit margins for private land developers.

Nevertheless, the sector will continue to show strength, with major projects being undertaken by the national housing authority which seeks to accommodate 276,000 nationals by 1986 according to a 5 year plan.

Other important projects scheduled for future is the advanced road network scheme, the expansion and upgrading of Kuwait International Airport (at a cost of kd 50 million) and a new city at Fintas (costed at kd 71 million). Another important project involves the construction of four major commercial and administrative centers in Fintas, Salmiya, Jahrah and Marqab, at an approximate cost of kd 600 million (2.2 billion dollars).

The recent decline in oil revenue is not expected to have a significant adverse impact on the implementation of most of these projects, the NBK report predicts.

Normally during a time of an economic downturn, pressures are brought to bear which dampen inflation.

In Kuwait, these positive effects will not be reaped in near future because of last year's ample liquidity which was translated into intense speculation in the securities and real estate markets and a general rise in consumer prices, the report stated. [as published]

Inflationary pressures in 1982 will remain high and inflation rate may be even pushed into the double digit level for 1981-82.

Hence the readjustment to lower levels of income is seen here as 'a good lesson' gained at a crucial time. Diversification and rationalization seem to hold the key to future development.

As positive factors the report cites the major reorganization of the oil sector in 1980 when the government assumed control over the setting up of a new oil company, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC), with a capital of kd 1 billion, to avoid duplication and overlapping. KPC functions as an umbrella organization which oversees all companies attached to the oil sector.

It is the country's buoyant financial sector which the government should look to as the real competitor of the oil sector, however.

Investment income (on capital lodged overseas chiefly in Western banks) is not included in the budget but in fiscal 1982-83 it is expected that it will for the first time 'match oil revenue,' NBK survey says.

"The country's economic prospects acquire new dimensions when tied to the fast growing financial sector. The rapid growth of the domestic financial institutions and their growing involvement in the international markets enhances the capabilities of these institutions preparing them for a greater role in recycling oil revenues."

As far as expansion of other sectors is concerned, the reports comments that 'some progress has been achieved in creating credible agricultural sector.'

CSO: 4400/372

SAUDI ARABIA

INVASION OF LEBANON UNDERLINES NEED FOR CONSENSUS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 279, 26 Jun 82 p 21

[Article by Salim Nassar]

[Text] The statement issued last Sunday by the Royal Saudi Council of State reawakened memories of the political situation in 1973 with all that accompanied it after the oil embargo in the way of economic crises that almost brought the Western world to a standstill and caused its monetary system to collapse completely.

Despite the series of preventive measures with which the Western bloc injected its sick economy during the last 2 years to provide individual immunity under the unexpected circumstances, the effect of the decision/warning was the factor that led to a reconsideration of the American stand and a modification of the European stand. The official statement with which King Fahd bin 'Abd al-'Aziz inaugurated his reign was tantamount to a renewal of the spirit of national action and commitment to a policy of Arab consensus. They are the two main pillars to which King 'Abd al-'Aziz anchored the foundations of his rule. Then King Faysal developed them through his domestic and foreign policies with their features and tendencies more clearly delineated. Guided by this inherited plan, the new king is trying to rally the scattered Arab power with all its different centers for the purpose of creating a broad Arab front in which regional blocs, ideological disputes, and political disagreements can dissolve. All this presupposes the need for the existence of a minimum of common denominators to close the rifts within the eastern front, control the clash on the Gulf front, and revive the possibilities of common defense within centralized relations in order to prevent the envelopment of Lebanon and deliverance of the coup de grace to the Palestinian cause.

It appears that the timing of the Saudi statement, which was announced a few hours before Reagan's meeting with Begin, disclosed to a large extent the Israeli calculations in employing the fears of the Iraqi-Iranian war to neutralize the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states and sabotage their political, economic and military roles. Caspar Weinberger's criticism was clear when he rejected the principle of force as a means of changing the horrible situation in Lebanon or its use as a bargaining chip in the stage of stabilizing security arrangements which frustrated the political negotiations to

ensure them, be it in the West Bank or throughout the Gulf region, all calculated pledges whose purpose was to torpedo the Saudi efforts and nullify its influence on the big powers.

It may have been the 1973 war with its limited victories that revealed the strength of the relationship between the Gulf front and the eastern front, for in the first three wars--1948, 1956, 1967--the eastern front states failed to achieve military victories because they did not tie the economic role of the Gulf states to general political goals. When King Faysal was assassinated in 1975, Israel thought Riyadh would subsequently follow a neutral line, turn inward, and gradually withdraw from the struggle. But exactly the opposite happened, for King Khalid aided by his deputies Prince Fahd and Prince 'Abdallah came forth full of zeal for the course outlined by 'Abd al-'Aziz, deepening his loyalty to the Arab and Islamic commitments made by Faysal.

During the last 7 years the Israelis were most disturbed by the fact that Saudi Arabia confirmed during this time that it was an indispensable participant if peace is to be achieved in Lebanon and the region because it has unlimited influence on the radical Arab states as well as on the moderate states. This central role provided it with a balanced policy which it used to settle disputes among the sister states or to create a unified stand against a policy of separate solutions, as happened at Camp David.

Sharon admitted during his last visit to Washington that Israel applied the linkage strategy originated by Henry Kissinger when it involved itself in the Gulf war in order to immobilize the Arab oil powers and nullify their influence and pressures on the forces concerned. Thus, the Iraqi-Iranian war was used in one manner as a vicious threat to draw the attention to that region away from the surprise attack on Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance. Then came the announcements from the Gulf states that confirmed their participation in the national stand and demonstrated that the existing goals are a commitment more than a predicament and that the challenge presented on the battlefield in Lebanon cannot be confronted due to lack of support from responsible quarters.

Hence, they say the clarification of the Palestinian choice in Lebanon will limit the proposals to East Jordan. Negotiations will be resumed in accordance with Begin's notion of an autonomous administration. It can be assumed after this that the Gulf region will urge confrontation with the danger of a greater Israel with all that ensues in the way of polarization in the region of both local and foreign forces.

What King Fahd said to George Bush last week in Riyadh did not differ from what King Faysal said to General De Gaulle on 3 June 1967. He told him that the unity of the Arab states against Israel automatically nullifies the partisan disputes, which some are betting on, and that the invasion of the capital of an independent Arab state will definitely hamper all political efforts and Arab attempts (to find a solution to the Palestinian problem) and force the Arab nation to face up to its historic responsibility to exercise its legitimate right to defend its lands and holy places with all its strength and capabilities.

King Fahd's proposals are derived from the need to open the file on the Middle East crisis on the basis of a just settlement and on the need for Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. This offer assumes the creation of a strategy of limited scope directed by specific decisions. The logic of consultation, in the opinion of Riyadh, requires the construction of a framework suitable for resumption of the inter-Arab dialogue, which was interrupted by the various disputes in the region and which has put a distance between its principle forces due to all the foreign interference with all it entails in bringing the Middle East crisis to an impasse.

The only option for extricating the Arabs from the crisis of shifting sands in Lebanon is simply to shape a collective will that will work to subdue Israeli power on the one hand, with the need to hold meetings to revive agreements and abolish disagreements [on the other]. They are the meetings which King Fahd once described as being concerned with the national duty and requiring visible movement on the Arab front, then taking practical steps to put an end to this continuing tragedy. Yesterday it was Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Today it is the South and half of Lebanon. Tomorrow it may be Beirut and one of the other Arab capitals.

Those who recently visited Saudi Arabia to offer their condolences got the general impression that the deteriorating situation in Lebanon requires, more than at any other time in the past, a mobilization of Arab capabilities around a joint strategy primarily concerned with resistance to Israeli plans. They discussed intensified political activity at different levels that may soon be manifested in the form of a unified stand.

The members of the delegation became aware that King Fahd mentioned with sorrow the previous Arab conferences that lacked the minimum of solidarity, which encouraged Israel to escalate its operations against Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. He said it is no easy task to achieve unity in this particular stage, but the Ramadan war of 1973 was like a warning. And he unified their position and disposed of all the points of difference. In his talks he cautioned against seeking solutions through other parties. He said that the Arab leaders are responsible for getting Lebanon out of its present predicament and that they must hasten to offer alternatives and choices so as not to give Israel any opportunity to rearrange the situation in a way that conflicts with our national interests, in such a manner that it imposes on Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine what it calls a fait accompli. That is because the Arabs are fighting Israel today in different places in different guises. But the war in Lebanon represents an important turning point in the history of the region. Hence, we say the crisis must be successfully surmounted. The Arabs have very little time to do big things. They cannot do so without joint effort as part of an integrated strategy that balances patriotic commitments with the power of this nation and its desire to achieve a just and comprehensive peace.

5214
CSO: 4404/552

SYRIA

SYRIAN MILITARY COMMENTATOR REFUTES ISRAELI WAR CLAIMS

JN192058 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 19 Jul 82

[Text] A military commentator in the general command of the army an armed forces has said that the Zionist invasion of Lebanon has violently shaken and split the Zionist entity as a result of the heavy losses sustained by the Israeli forces. In an interview with the Sana correspondent, the commentator stressed that in order to hide the facts, several Israeli commanders made statements claiming Israeli tanks' superiority over Syrian tanks and exaggerating the qualities of the U.S.-made F-15 and F-16 aircraft.

The commentator said: The truth which must be told is that most of what the Zionist commanders said was an obvious deception to boost the Israeli soldiers morale, which was shattered during the ferocious battles with the Syrian forces.

The commentator said that the U.S. war machine has failed to achieve Israel's final aims. He added: Israel's modern M-48 and M-60 tanks could not gain any successes against our 5-62 and 5-72 tanks. Our heroic fighters are fully aware of the fact that the Israeli enemy lost more than 400 tanks and tracked vehicles in the major tank battle with Syrian tanks and antiarmor weapons in the southern region of the al-Biqa' and on the Bhamdun-Beirut axis.

The commentator asserted that all our weapons have proved their efficacy in the confrontation, and our armored corps was able to deal several blows to the enemy, check its advance in most areas and force it to retreat in others, leaving behind destroyed and sound tanks.

The commentator also asserted that our armed forces carried out heroic epics to which Lebanese soil and people testify. By their absolute cooperation with the Palestinian revolution forces and the Lebanese joint forces, our forces set the most splendid example of heroism, sacrifice and selflessness in an effective confrontation of the Israeli-U.S. invasion forces, [words indistinct] villages and installations, kill the Arabs and wipe out their history.

CSO: 4400/372

SYRIA

FURTHER ON AL-ASAD'S CLERGY ADDRESS

JN190754 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0415 GMT 19 Jul 82

[Excerpts] President Hafiz al-Asad hosted a banquet in the al-Dimashqiyah Hall yesterday evening in honor of the Muslim clergymen on the occasion of the holy month of Ramadan.

In response to the clergymen's request the president spoke on the occasion. He began by indicating the great spiritual and historical value attached to the holy month of Ramadan in light of the major events which took place in this blessed month in past and modern history.

The president said: When talking about events we have lived in the blessed month of Ramadan, we remember 10 Ramadan, which corresponds to 6 October 1973, which was a great spiritual, material, Pan-Arab and religious event which we must continually bear in mind because it was an accomplishment of this generation achieved in the blessed month of Ramadan with the blood of our sons and brothers. When talking about the blessed month of Ramadan we also remember these glorious days in which we waged large and honorable battles. The aggression against Lebanon began shortly before Ramadan and continued during Ramadan. Your sons have waged the fiercest, bravest and most honorable battles.

Talking about the war in Lebanon, the president said that our forces did not enter Lebanon to fight Israel from there, but entered it to end a civil war of international and external extensions. Therefore, he said, our forces were performing the tasks of policemen and not those of a regular army. Despite the fact that the tasks have changed and despite the fact that we are fighting on a land which is not prepared by us to confront the enemy and that we do not have in Lebanon large forces, various weapons and mobilization, engineering and other requirements to confront the enemy, fighting was imposed on us and our army stood up proudly, strongly and honorably. Real epics were recorded. We know what the enemy possesses in technological equipment and aircraft. We were getting ready in light of that. However, our decision was to strongly and unhesitatingly confront the enemy when it committed aggression. The outcome of battles and wars is not the only important issue. The outcome is important, but what is more important is the mode of behavior. When we fight honorably for martyrdom and when the enemy cannot advance an inch except over our bodies, we will not at all be considered to have lost the battle. Whatever the outcome of the battle might be, we will be regarded the winners.

The president pointed out that the difference between the enemy forces in Lebanon and our limited forces there did not prevent our forces from fighting heroically, holding out, achieving great deeds and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. The morale of all our forces' corps and units was a source of pride. Our forces' heroic deeds deserve to be immortalized by our writers and artists as these deeds stand for our history.

The president gave many examples of our armed forces' valor and heroic deeds on land and in the air. He said that observers and even the enemy admitted these heroic deeds. He said that our ground forces and pilots have drawn the most splendid pictures of audacity, manliness and love of martyrdom. They put up valiant resistance despite the enemy's employment of every type of weapon, including nerve gas which it used after being solidly and relentlessly confronted by our forces.

The president indicated what al-Sadat did after his surrender to the enemy. He offered Israel and the United States weapons similar to those used by our forces. Thus, these weapons were known to the enemy. The president said: When the U.S. envoy proposed a cease-fire, we rejected the proposal unless this cease-fire was linked with a comprehensive Israeli withdrawal. When this condition was approved on the next day we agreed to the cease-fire.

The president pointed out that during the first days of the invasion he had telephone contact with the Lebanese president and stressed to him that this invasion was an opportunity to freeze grudges, close ranks and achieve national accord in Lebanon when all concerned parties adopt one stand against occupation with equal patriotism. The president added: We must continue the process of construction and implant the love of martyrdom in the minds and hearts of our sons and citizens. By doing so, he said, we build a strong and impregnable homeland which cannot be harmed by any enemy no matter how tyrannical.

Concluding, the president said: Two years ago we decided to withdraw our forces from Lebanon, but the Lebanese president asked us to keep them there so that the civil war would not be renewed. We agreed on condition that efforts be exerted to achieve national accord. In the 2d year we decided to withdraw our forces, but the national Lebanese parties and the national Lebanese people asked us to keep them there. We responded to their request. We held out in Lebanon with small forces. Our forces do not [words indistinct] in besieged Beirut. We rejected the enemy's warning to withdraw them and they are still at the head of the steadfast forces who are defending the city. We rejected the request to withdraw our forces from Lebanon at a time when the Israeli forces are occupying Lebanese territory. In reply to the request to withdraw our forces we said it is illogical to ask the withdrawal of the Syrian forces while the Israeli forces are in Beirut. Let us first of all cooperate against the Israelis, then we can discuss our affairs among ourselves. We say that we are carrying out our duty toward Lebanon, the Palestinian cause and the Arab nation. We will continue to offer sacrifices for them. We are optimistic about the future and we want to build a strong homeland in which we can live with dignity. We have right to boast of our steadfastness and our forces' fighting against the enemy. The losses we inflicted on the enemy are today causing the enemy problems inside Israel. The enemy used to strike with air-

craft and tanks and put an end to everything. The enemy planned to complete its invasion in 72 hours, but a small number of Syrian forces forced it to fight with all weapons for 5 days in order to advance 3 and 1/2 km in the Bhamdun area after using the nerve gas.

The president ended his address by stressing the importance of continuing work and upholding dignity. He said that man needs bread to live but does not live on bread alone. Man needs dignity and we are determined to defend dignity. We want our dignity and homeland uplifted.

CSO: 4400/372

TUNISIA

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT'S THEORETICAL VIEWS SUMMARIZED

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 11 Jun 82 p 4

/Article: "This Is the Islamic Tendency on the Occasion of the First Anniversary of Its Establishment"/

/Text/ It has now been a whole year since the declaration of the establishment of the Islamic Tendency Movement Party, whose activity has been severely restricted by the arrest of its most prominent leaders and fighting men and their imprisonment after being given harsh sentences.

Out of its belief in freedom of expression and political activity and every citizen's right to "organize," and out of its belief in the fact that the people in the Islamic Tendency were innocent of the charges leveled against them:

And on the occasion of this anniversary, AL-RA'Y is publishing this introduction to the political and ideological character of the movement.

Mr Rached Ghanouchi, leader of the movement, described the outlines of this organization /in/ a statement he made to the magazine LE CONTINENT after his movement had presented an application for a permit, before it was shut down. This states:

"Our fundamental base is Islam, which we consider the basic source of our hypotheses, our orientations and our positions, as well as the various programs we embrace, while at all times bearing in mind the true state of the country and the nature of its people. Our movement is also the voice of the downtrodden members of Tunisian society, the voice of everyone who needs and hungers for freedom and democracy."

Mr Ghanouchi went on to say,

"The fact that the Islamic Tendency presented an application for a party permit came about as a consequence of the democratic course the new government has started to pursue but as a consequence of the nature of the development of our movement, with the goal of enabling it to participate in political life like other movements."

In the press conference which accompanied the declaration of the establishment of the Islamic Tendency Movement, the movement's positions and conceptions on a number of issues of an ideological dimension were stated. We present some of these as follows:

The Notion of Political Action

"To us, political action is not just aimed at getting seats in parliament or seats in the cabinet: to us, it goes deeper than all that. At this stage, its aim is to provide a climate of freedom through which we can move toward our great objective. Political activity in essence sets forth from the premise of intellectual freedom and cultural freedom, and we, as an Islamic movement, consider that struggle is essentially, before all else, a struggle in the sociocultural field more than the political one in general. Our political approach is ultimately an expression of our intellectual and cultural approach and, consequently, the struggle at the cultural and intellectual level is to restore to our nation its identity, to restore to man his esteem and his personality, and to link political action to the conscience and history of the nation. That is political action to us--it is not just running after seats in parliament or the acquisition of positions of power."

Relations with the Muslim Brotherhood

"These relations are like all relations with other Islamic forces. Thus what ties us to the Muslim Brotherhood is what ties us to the other Muslims in the world. We deal with them as we deal with others, in a free manner, in the light of Islam as we understand it and in the light of our local domestic interests and circumstances."

Democracy

"Since democracy is a question of enabling the people to determine their destiny, Islam calls for it and calls for the repudiation of the imposition of anything on people by force."

Theocracy

"I would like to assert from the outset that Islamic thinking, and the Islamic Tendency Movement, do not believe in Islamic theocratic rule, because they do not believe that there are people who can appoint themselves guardians in the name of Islam or in the name of God or as official spokesmen for either, specifying a specific notion for people and forcing that on them."

Pluralism

"We are absolutely not against the existence of any other tendencies in the country and we are absolutely not against the emergence of any political movement, no matter how radically and basically it differs with us. When we present our hypotheses we do so in the belief that it is the people, and nothing else, that will bring us to power. Therefore we do not have the right to prevent any opposing party from presenting its programs. This stand arises from a genuinely Islamic legal position of principle, and we do not at all consider it our right to impose prohibitions; rather, that is the right of the people."

11887
CSO: 4504/391

INCIDENTS OF RURAL UPRISING REVIEWED

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 28 May 82 p 2

/Article: "What Happened in Talah?"/

/Text/ Citizens from Talah have conveyed this item of news to us:

On Monday 24 May 1982, Talah witnessed a march which rapidly turned into a demonstration by the people in which the citizens expressed their objection to and rejection of the government decrees infringing on their interests. This march was launched at about 1930 hours in the evening and lasted till 2230 hours at night. More than 1,000 citizens--children, young people, women and old people--gathered together and shouted a number of slogans, such as "Where are your rights, heroes?" "Lime, lime," "Talah, you grievously damaged place" and so forth.

The causes: The main cause was the decree calling for the cancellation of the lime plant, contrary to the studies that were made and the purchase of land on which the plant was to be built and the dwellings for the personnel that were to supervise the activities and the course of production were to be erected. The indirect causes were the wretched poverty the citizens of this region are suffering from, the unemployment and the absence of educational personnel.

The events: A Group of unemployed persons gathered before the mayor's office and shouted slogans concerning the problem of the factory. Soon large numbers of citizens joined these people, and, in the face of this situation, the officials contented themselves by taking an attitude of indifference. All the party officials, the mayor and the heads of police and guard posts vanished, and the demonstrators made a number of processions through the main street of the town and the streets close by, shouting the slogans that had been referred to above. Some stones were thrown into private and public shops, car windows were broken, and the police center was critically damaged. The security aides' response was to fire more than 190 shots into the air and to direct tear gas (more than 20 canisters) at the citizens. The demonstrators, whose numbers increased, did not stop until about 2230 hours in the evening when some reinforcements arrived from Kasserine. Security vehicles continued to roam the streets until morning, and a large number of citizens (teachers, government employees, trade union officials, unemployed persons and so forth) were arrested: according to some observers, the number of arrested persons exceeded 100.

Observations

This demonstration assumed a violent character only when the officials greeted it with indifference.

Why weren't suspicious persons who took part in the march and the destructive activities arrested?

The personal dignity of some union members and citizens was violated when they were arrested in their homes and places of work and taken to Kasserine.

Why were all the officials away from the town during the march, starting in the evening?

The clashes went on until Tuesday.

An Appeal from the People of Talah to the League for the Defense of Human Rights

The people of Talah are giving notice to public opinion and people in the country holding vigorous patriotic consciences of the incidents which occurred on Monday 24 May 1982 that resulted in the arrest of more than 100 citizens, in the wake of the march which turned into a people's demonstration in protest against the decree to cancel the lime plant which was to be built in Talah, whose construction studies that had been made confirmed was feasible.

We demand that all nationalist and democratic forces, at their forefront the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights, support us in our struggle.

We demand the release of all arrested persons.

We launch a severe protest against the authorities' conduct vis-a-vis the citizens, depriving them of the most basic human rights, for instance using weapons and tear gas canisters against defenseless citizens.

We call upon all branches of the League for the Defense of Human Rights to pause to intervene on behalf of the arrested persons and enlighten public opinion in the country.

/Signed/ Citizens of the town of Talah

11887

CSO: 4504/391

TUNISIA

RIFT BETWEEN UGTT, OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No. 239, 21 Jun 82 pp 28, 29

[Excerpt] It appears that both the return of Habib Achour to the federation [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] and his election as its president by the rank and file during the National Congress convened in mid-November 1981 have confused some of the opposition movements, especially the Tunisian Communist Party. This is due to the fact that Achour is a strong personality, difficult to exploit and control; moreover, his political and unionist experience is beyond compare. The seventies had witnessed the entrance of youths into the union and the proliferation of political currents within it. These new and enthusiastic forces played an important role in the trade-unionist struggles and in raising the consciousness of the workers and farmers through public meetings and the newspaper AL-SHA'B, the organ of the Tunisian General Federation of Labor. It is certain that most of the opposition currents--and they are for the most part weak--wishes to use the federation for their own benefit and are working to become strong inside of it so as to expand their popular base and hence to exert pressure on the regime.

The dispute between the federation and the opposition movements began during the legislative elections which were held last November when the trade-unionists agreed to participate in the elections on the side of the Destourian Socialist Party. The opposition movements criticized this participation and the Movement of Socialist Democrats considered it "a betrayal of those who stood by the union during its great ordeal." The disagreement within the federation itself between the elements supporting Habib Achour, the President, and those supporting Taieb Baccouche, the Secretary General, subsequently erupted. Naturally, the union leadership hastened to refute the "rumors" and announced that "no disagreement exists between the President and the Secretary General." But those who follow trade-unionist activity and are well-informed of what goes on behind the scenes had knowledge of the evolution of this dispute. It is certain that Houssine Ben Kaddour--one of the members of the Executive Bureau--was one of those enthusiastic about this disagreement for he is well known for his nationalist tendencies and wants to weaken the influence of Taieb Bacchouche who has communist tendencies. Houssine Ben Kaddour has announced many times before the trade-unionist rank and file and to some of the proteges in the

Executive Bureau that Taieb Baccouche is engaged in a conspiracy against the independence of the federation by opening wide the doors to the communists and the proteges of the communist party. As for Achour, he maintained that "the federation which struggled against the domination of the ruling party will not consent to entering under the umbrella of any other party or current even if it bandies about slogans calling for respect for the working class and the need for saving it from disgrace and exploitation." Afterwards, the relation between the federation and the Movement of Socialist Democrats took a turn for the worse. The newspaper AL-MUSTAQBAL--the organ of this movement--accused (the trade-unionists who did not yet understand the nature of the struggle for democracy). The trade-unionists--Habib Achour's wing--said that "that is considered an interference in the affairs of the federation," and that "the federation will not accept anyone's tutelage." As for the extremist political currents like the Tunisian Worker and the Marxist-Leninist Workers' Organization, they are of the opinion that the federation is an organization which serves the interest of the bourgeoisie more than it serves the interest of the workers. It considers Achour "one of the bourgeois elements which have infiltrated the federation." Therefore, they urged the necessity of his removal so that the workers' organization becomes stronger and more steadfast in confronting the regime and capitalism. But it appears that Achour is indifferent to what happens around him and is depending on his trade-unionist experience and enthusiasm which hardly any of those opposing him, whether in the federation or out of it, possess. Moreover, Houssine Ben Kaddour, who is on his side in this dispute, is considered among the brightest and most important elements in the leadership of the federation. Those who attended the extraordinary Qafsa Congress in April 1981 know that he is the one who enabled Taieb Baccouche to assume the secretariat general due to the popularity he enjoyed among the phosphate workers in Qafsa. In this way, the war which subsided between the party and the federation has now started between the federation and the opposition movements. But the workers will definitely be on the side of their organization because it is "the only strong and responsible opposition," according to the description of one of the senior trade-unionist officials.

As for the opposition movements, their campaign against the federation will become more violent and vicious because without the trade-unionist organization, they will remain restricted, weak and incapable of effective political pressure. Likewise, they will strive to add fuel to the dispute between the President, Habib Achour, and the Secretary General, Taieb Baccouche, in order to create a window through which "the crushed classes" can breathe. The only opposition current which appears disinterested in the federation and the working class is the Muslim Brothers. Most of its elements are still in prison. Furthermore, in all of its texts and publications it speaks of Hasan al-Banna, Khomeyni, good and evil, and angels and devils more than it speaks of current Tunisian reality and the problems society faces.

CSO: 4504/420

END